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Introduction
As the international demand for knowledge sharing for development cooperation is 
growing, supply of development experiences is increasing from diverse sources that 
include traditional donor countries, middle-income countries and even low-income 
countries (TT-SSC, 2011). Many countries and international organizations are committing 
to make their accumulated development experiences available, broaden the available 
knowledge base, and provide easier access to broadened knowledge base by identifying 
and documenting such knowledge (Working group for G20, 2011). 
Recent literature on knowledge sharing suggests two key ideal conditions for 
successful knowledge sharing. First, knowledge demand and supply should be matched up 
in an effective brokering mechanism (Kumar et al., 2016). Second, not only explicit or 
codified information but also practical experiences of the how-to of development and 
policy reform, so-called, tacit knowledge, should be shared through interactions among 
people facing similar challenges in similar institutional contexts (Janus, 2016). 
In practice, however, the ideal of knowledge sharing may obscure more than it 
clarifies due to inherent challenges in knowledge production process that is a pre-requisite 
for any knowledge sharing. For example, one of the challenges is called ‘brokering 
bottlenecks’ that prevent effective matching of the demand and supply of knowledge 
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(Working Group for G20, 2011). These bottlenecks are ascribed to the lack of capacity 
on the demand side to identify what is needed and the lack of information about what is 
available on the supply side (Sowell, 1980; Spender and Grant, 1996; Working Group for 
G20, 2011). So far, knowledge sharing has been mostly supply-driven from the anchor to 
the regions (Working Group for G20, 2011). Another challenge is inherent ambiguity of 
tacit knowledge that makes it difficult to articulate, learn, hence to transfer such 
knowledge (Hakanson and Nobel, 1998). 
Despite the importance of knowledge production, however, both academic literature 
and practical prescriptions tend to emphasize the importance of effective knowledge 
sharing modalities and focus on what happens in the knowledge recipient side once the 
knowledge is transferred, that is, how recipients can internalize and adapt knowledge into 
their own contexts. Relatively little attention is made on how to construct and produce 
knowledge for successful knowledge sharing. 
Although approaches to knowledge sharing that only relies on the codification of 
knowledge into databases that operate on a pull basis have proved to be less effective 
(Snowden, 2011), the necessary step for knowledge sharing is codification of knowledge 
in physical or virtual information repositories or database where the knowledge seekers 
can explore the existing relevant knowledge. Thus, this paper focuses on one modality of 
knowledge sharing – unilateral production of case studies on development experiences. 
The relevant question is whether and how case studies of development experiences are 
constructed in a way to make recipient countries utilize (internalize and adapt) such 
knowledge effectively. 
Focusing on a Korean story of development, this paper intends to deal with the 
questions of how we can construct our development story better so that our story could 
be shared (and utilized better). Ultimately, beyond sharing out knowledge, we can figure 
out better where we are by identifying Korean governing DNAs (Korean traits associated 
with our development experience), with which we can even chart better where we are 
going in the future) with more effort to reconstruct our understanding of our experience.
Challenges of constructing a case of development experience
Constructing a story of a country’s development experience is a very difficult task in 
several aspects. First, when a case is introduced as a successful story or with positive 
connotation of achievement, there is a problem of non-objective judgment of success. For 
example, it is a value-judgement to determine a success. Faster achievement of something 
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but ignoring or sacrificing other needs (or, high level of GDP per capital but lower level 
of happiness among people) is a success? Or, slower achievement of the same thing but 
balancing other interests (or, lower level of GDP per capital but high level of happiness) 
is a success? While efficiency (or fast achievement of something) can be regarded as 
only a virtue in a story, audience may have a different definition of success, e.g., 
fairness or equality. Thus, a case should be constructed in a way audience can determine 
for themselves the meaning of certain outcomes in the story. What happened in a 
country needs to be presented in a case study objectively without subjective connotation 
of a success or failure, and be compared with those in other similar countries in order 
to just show how the outcomes are different from others.
Second, related with the first point above, a success (subjectively defined) in the past 
may have unintended, negative consequences on future. A success today may be the 
source of problem tomorrow. As Paul Krugman (1994) argues in his ‘the Myth of Asia’s 
Miracle,’ rapid but short-term high-level economic growth of South Korea led by the 
authoritarian government and leadership with strategic economic policies with perspiration 
of public was not sustained but caused economic crisis in 1997. Thus, success in one 
period may become a cause for problem in other periods. Thus, we need to be careful 
not to imply that certain positive factors during specific, short-time frame should be 
emulated in other countries without bearing risk of negative consequences in the long 
run. Or certain positive factor in specific time frame should be presented with its 
potential consequences in the future.  
Third, certain outcomes observed in a case may be a product of a complex function 
or interplay of many contributing factors that include endogenous factors, such as actors’ 
values, ideas, capacities, culture and exogenous factors including global economic 
situations. Thus, a story that links outcomes with only a few parts of the equation may 
mislead audience to miss out on really important pieces of the picture. For example, 
when a case study suggests a certain policy (contents) only as a key factor in delivering 
certain outcomes in a country, it may not be guaranteed that actors in other countries 
may not produce same outcomes with the same policy under different contexts. No 
policymakers may be interested in introducing that policy from the beginning. Even if 
policymakers are motivated to introduce the policy, it may not be implemented due to 
resistance from stakeholders, or due to lack of capacity to implement it (Andrew et al., 
2017). Thus, constructing a case properly needs an analytic framework that incorporates 
the network of endogenous traits and exogenous factors so that audience can understand 
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the interaction of contributing factors. 
Fourth, when we present ‘Korean’ development experience, there is vagueness in 
setting units of analysis in defining “Korean” in a story. It may mean just something 
happened ‘in Korea.’ It also connotates more specifically Korean ‘policies,’ or Korean 
‘decision-makers’ or Korean ‘government’ as a whole, or Korean ‘institutions or laws’, or 
Korean ‘people’ or ‘culture.’ Assuming that consumers (users, audience, reader) of case 
studies are mostly government officials, case studies tend to explain policy contents, or 
emphasize particular leadership of top decision-makers, or describe strategic 
implementation plan of government officials. In other words, the stories are 
government-centered. However, this paper posits that ‘Korean’ denotes all kinds of 
Korean ‘people’ who generate or import ideas, formulate or implement policies, respond 
to and overcome challenges, demand or comply with policies. In the same breath, this 
paper defines Korean development experience as experience of network of Korean people 
who responds to their development challenges. Thus, storytelling should be actor-centered 
in conjunction with specific contexts, internal or/and external. Focusing on only single 
actor such as a political leader or a few actors, or specific institutions and policies as 
the unit of analysis may miss on other important actors that may play important roles in 
making and implementing public policies in various venues. Thus, we need to have more 
comprehensive framework that incorporates much larger network of people including 
general public or experts as unit of analysis who ultimately create institutions, make and 
implement public policies.
Fifth, another inherent challenge in constructing a country-level development 
experience is the possibility that the importance (or weight) of successful factors may 
change in long-term story. For example, while pure luck or specific capability might be 
the most significant factor in the first chapter of the entire story, other factors, such as 
different kinds of capacity or other actors might become more important in explaining 
outcomes, as the capacity and value system of people develop and contexts also change 
in entire story. While strong government interventions might be a successful factor in the 
1960s and 1970s, those factors are not consistently influential throughout the entire story 
of Korean development. Rather, non-governmental actors, such as private sectors and civil 
societies might play more influential roles in continuing to construct successful story. 
When we expand our analytic scope (not narrow down to specific period of the story) 
into the broad time spans, it will be inappropriate to generalize certain factor, such as 
strong government intervention, as successful factor that has been influential in entire 
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story or typical Korean feature in development. Thus, we need to develop an analytic 
framework to identify distinct ‘Korean’ factors that worked only in specific context and 
factors that cut across different period or contexts consistently. And a story covering 
long-term developmental phases should be constructed in a way audience could 
understand how weight or importance of contributing factors changed along the phases so 
that they could link the chains of development with different kinds of factors. 
Last, but not the least, important point in constructing a story of development 
experience is the role of context, particularly in the form of internal or external 
challenges that are faced by various actors. This paper assumes that story of development 
experience is distilled into interaction between development challenges and a network of 
actors in a country. Thus, how a network of actors in a country tried to respond to and 
overcome specific development challenges may give more useful implications to audience 
in other countries who face similar kinds of development challenges. 
Form and characteristics of knowledge
Knowledge can be categorized as ‘codified (explicit) and/or tacit know-how’ (Teece, 
2000). Certain components of knowledge can be explicit, in other words, be verbalized, 
written, drawn, or otherwise articulated. However, knowledge is often characterized by 
significant levels of information, which is not codified, and information that is 
embodied/residing in people or institutions. Such knowledge, so-called ‘tacit knowledge’ 
resides in individual cognition and organizational routines acquired through experience and 
use in a specific context (Polanyi, 1966). 
While development practitioners demand codified or academic information, what they 
really need is each other’s practical experiences of the how-to of development and policy 
reform as peers. Thus, sharing of the practical, how-to dimension of knowledge is 
essential characteristics of knowledge sharing and learning. However, tacit knowledge is 
hard to articulate and communicate it. 
The characteristics of tacit knowledge seem to be related to their level of ‘causal 
ambiguity’ (Lippman and Rumelt, 1982) that is often singled out as an important factor 
affecting knowledge transfer (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996; Szulanski, 
1996). Since tacit knowledge can be embedded in people (Engstrom et al., 1990), tools, 
technology, tasks, or routines (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Kostova, 1999; Leonard-Barton, 
1992), however, ambiguity about how the sub-networks (i.e., people, tools, technology, 
tasks, or routines) interactively define the function of interest determines the difficulty of 
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knowledge transfer. The greater the causal ambiguity, the more difficult it is to identify 
the related knowledge elements and sub-networks. 
Considering the knowledge elements and factors to facilitate knowledge sharing, this 
article develops a framework to organize case studies for knowledge sharing. First, all 
the cases can include explicit and codified information that can be verbalized, written, 
and articulated. For example, a case can describe specific policy contents, regulations, or 
provisions in the law in details. Also, the structure of the institutions to formulate such 
policies and implement them can be drawn with detailed information on the number of 
staff and financial resources. Second, the challenge in case studies is how to present tacit 
knowledge that is inherently difficult to articulate and embedded in people, tool, routines, 
task, and network. Thus, it is necessary to interview people and draw their tacit 
knowledge embedded in other sub-networks.
Knowledge production and database in Korea and World Bank
Modularization cases on South Korea’s development experience 
Korean government has made efforts to capture and construct development experience 
of South Korea from liberalization from Japanese colonial period in 1945 up to global 
financial crisis in 2007. So-called ‘Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) modularization 
project’ was initiated by Korea Development Institute (KDI) School of Public Policy and 
Management as a knowledge repository and sponsored by the Korean Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (MOSF) in 2007 in order to share South Korea’s development 
experience with other development countries through policy consultations and knowledge 
sharing activities where policy experts and decision-makers interact on specific 
development issues in a partner country (Kim and Tcha, 2012). More than 150 subjects 
were selected by each relevant central ministry on the ground that those topics include 
successful stories relevant to Korean development experience ranging from industrial 
policy, agricultural policy, government reform, economic growth, education, public health, 
and environment. Authors for each case study interviewed main actors in the story as 
actual policy-makers and implementers for specific policy measures.
KSP modularization cases have a few characteristics as first-hand resources for 
knowledge-sharing. First, identifying and writing about successful cases in KSP 
modularization is mostly a supply-driven activity. Even if almost all central agencies 
participated in selecting cases for knowledge sharing, their subjective opinions on what 
should be shared as Korean development experience determined the subjects and 
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topics. Second, mostly importantly, knowledge in many cases in modularization cases 
consists of mainly explicit knowledge, such as substantive policy measures, 
institutional structures and policy outcomes rather than how to formulate and 
implement such measures. The tendency to focus too much on explicit knowledge in 
knowledge construction has limitations in knowledge sharing. Specific substantive 
policy packages and institutional structures to make or implement such policies in one 
country might not be useful or working properly in another country with different 
culture or context. When knowledge producers are ignorant of the context that 
knowledge users are embedded in, capacities that knowledge users have, and 
challenges that knowledge users face, knowledge producers simply explain apparent 
features of what they did in the form of policy measures, institutions, and policy 
outcomes. Knowledge of how-to of development and policy reform often hinges on 
tacit knowledge that is inherently difficult to articulate and embedded in people, tool, 
routines, task, and network, and value system.
Global Development Initiative (GDI) by World Bank 
World Bank started to collect development experience cases from all around the 
world with a lens, called, “science of delivery,” under the leadership of President Kim, 
Yong that focuses challenges in implementation process (Asis and Woolcock, 2015). 
Global Development Initiative (GDI) of World Bank developed its own typologies to 
identify various development challenges and implementation challenges that would be 
used as a template or guideline in constructing case studies. GDI has same assumption 
that this study has, that is, that readers of cases can get more useful implications from 
cases by being sensitive to challenges that actors in the case faced. However, GDI case 
studies only focus on implementation of a single policy with an assumption that what 
matters is not the idea but the its implementation. This narrow scope has a few 
limitations in knowledge construction and sharing. First, very often, it is a very import 
issue for leaders in developing countries to get or generate appropriate ideas and select 
one among controversial ideas in competition. Thus, assuming certain policy ideas are 
given as appropriate ones from the beginning and only focusing on its implementation 
may be misleading. Second, GDI covers only one single policy and a single development 
and implementation challenge. In reality, there are multiple challenges associated with 
multiple policies that are implemented at the same time. Without untangling such a 
complex interaction, it is very difficult to get appropriate implications from successful 
stories with tangible or positive outcomes.
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Framework to construct a case of development experience
Considering challenges in constructing a case of development experience, this study 
proposes a new analytic framework that incorporates the concept of governance as a 
key template to understand the story and draw implications better (Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Framework to construct a case of development experience
The concept of governance is useful in the effort to capture traits of success in 
some aspects. First, ‘governance’ is ‘used to grasp, on the one hand, institutions (a 
“structure of rules”), and on the other hand, a process (that of steering), which is 
taking place in the framework of these institutions’ (Offe, 2009). Institutions can cover 
actors, network of actors as main unit of analysis and their vision, interests, ideas 
(policy options). And process include their strategies and behaviors to form 
organizations, develop policies, building a coalition, and negotiate agreements. So, 
governance framework can expand scopes in terms of numbers of actors in the story 
and timespan to consider long-term processes of steering where various aspects of 
actors can be observed. 
Another important feature of this new framework is to incorporate the roles of 
contexts (situations, luck) surrounding actors by postulating that actors’ governance 
story is just to realize their visions, set the targets, and make and implement ideas 
(policies) by overcoming challenges and utilizing opportunities given by contexts. In 
this story telling, something ‘Korean’ (which may be distinguished from actors in 
other countries) can be manifested in ‘Korean’ actors’ visions (norms and values that 
are affected by culture and ideology), their interests (what they want to achieve), their 
targets (how they set the targets), their ideas (where and how ideas (means) are 
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developed), their implementation strategies (how to implement) in constant chain 
reactions with given or self-created contexts.
This framework that follows interactions between contexts and actors has a few 
advantages in sharing stories with other compared to traditional frameworks that only 
focuses on a few top leadership, specific policies, or implementation strategies to 
explain a successful achievement of a country. The new framework of governance 
may prevent authors from generalizing certain policy ideas, strategic decisions from 
leaders, and their implementation strategies as secret factors for a success regardless of 
contexts. Also, audience can identify specific contexts as challenges and opportunities 
in a story and match those with their own contexts in order to get meaningful 
implications or takeaways from the story.
Since the concept of governance vis-à-vis government started to rise from early 
1990 (e.g., Kooiman (1993)), some may doubt the efficacy of governance framework 
to analyze successful stories of a country that happened before early 1990s. However, 
when we define governance as a process where a network of actors with certain 
values and interests respond to a series of challenges, internal or external, by 
generating ideas, making decisions, and implementing them and we can observe those 
actor’s traits, behaviors, and challenges (contexts), then governance framework can be 
utilized to analyze what happens in any situations. 
Analysts using this new framework should be careful not to judge actors’ values, 
ideas, strategies normatively based on their non-objective criteria. Certain strategies or 
behaviors of actors in making or implementing decisions can be observed and 
interpreted in such a way that those behaviors lead to certain outcomes. When it 
comes to values or interests of actors that drive those strategies and behaviors cannot 
be judged as good or bad ones. For example, rapid increase of exports can be 
ascribed to adopting and implementing certain policy measures by analysts but, they 
can just identify actors’ values or interests behind their decisions but not judge those 
were good or bad from their own subjective criteria. It is very important to maintain 
neutrality in analysis and conduct observation and interpretation as objectively as 
possible. 
Finally, if we want to understand a successful developmental story of a country 
that covers a long-span (more than 50 years), there may be many different actors 
(from old generations to relatively young generations) who made influential impact on 
specific and different junctures of the whole story. Objective analysis might serve as 
an opportunity to acknowledge their different contributions to the story and bridge the 
gap between the generations in a country by finding common features of success 
across the generations.  
12
Literature on Korean development experience
The story of South Korea’s transformation from an impoverished, agricultural, 
war-stricken country to a rich, industrial, democratic one is fascinating enough to draw 
lots of scholastic attention and effort to answer the question of the secrets of its 
transformation. Most studies focus on its economic success, so-called ‘the Miracle of Han 
River’ before 1997 financial crisis (Table 1). 
Table 1. Exemplary studies on Korean economic development before 1987 financial crisis
Author(s) Contributing factors
1. Amsden (1989)
• Learning existing Western technologies as a latecomer 
rather than innovation
• Efficient government intervention policy in the optimal 
allocation of resources
2. Krugman (1994)
• Authoritarian, strategic economic policies
• Perspiration (labor and commitment) rather than 
inspiration
3. Song (2003)
• Outward, Industry, and Growth (OIG) strategy 
• Confucian ethic as an underlying basis for development
• Land use, a family-planning program, savings and 
consumption behaviors
4. World Bank (1993)
• Rapid physical and human capital accumulation
• Government’s market-friendly policy
5. Cho (1994)
• Abundance of good workers of high standard of literacy, 
discipline, and desire to grow
• Vigorous entrepreneurship
• Export-led growth strategy along with effective 
government development strategy
6. Toussaint (2006)
• (1) government intervention, (2) US technical and 
financial support, (3) land reform, (4) transition from 
import substitution to export promotion, (5) authoritarian 
planning, (6) state control over banking sector, currency 
exchange, capital flows and product prices, (7) US 
protection, (8) education, (9) scarcity of natural resources
7. Mason (1997)
• Slower rates of population growth favored investment in 
education and incentives for saving, which accelerated the 
economic development
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When it comes to endogenous, actor-centered traits of so-called ‘the Miracle of Han 
River’ in South Korea, several commentators emphasize the benevolent or effective 
leaderships of the South Korean presidents, such as Lee, Seung-Man1), Park, Jung-Hee, 
and Kim, Dae-Jung (Amsden, 1989; Campos and Root, 1996; Chang, 1993; Evans, 1995; 
Haggard, 1990; Kim, 1987; Woo, 1991; World Bank ,1993). Others also focus on the 
roles of competent, hard-working, and not corrupted bureaucratic elites in making and 
implementing policies that had brought tangible successful outcomes in economic 
development (Evans, 1995; Kim, 1987; Cumings, 1984; Kohli, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 
1995; Lie, 1998). Other scholars also argue that specific exogenous political and global 
economic contexts around South Korea, such as ideological competition with North Korea 
(Campos and Root, 1996; Doner et al., 2005; Kang, 2002; Woo-Cumings, 1998), reduced 
inequality in the society through land reform and the Korean war (Amsden, 1989; 
Cummings, 1984; Lie, 1998; Minns, 2001; Rodrik et al., 1995) provided a favorable 
foundation for economic development. 
Reconstruction of the story of Korean stabilization policies in the 1980s.
This study intends to explore what kinds of knowledge should be shared in a case 
study of development experience by considering a framework for more effective 
knowledge construction for knowledge sharing and by taking a successful story among 
150 modularization cases of KSP, so-called, “Korean stabilization policies in the 1980s.”
1) Lee, Seung-Man is the first president of the Republic of Korea, who was inaugurated in 1948 and stepped down in 1960.)
Author(s) Contributing factors
8. Chang (2003)
• The internal operations of Korean business groups and 
their role in the Korean economy
• Financial crisis due to the failed adaptation to changing 
external environments by the business groups and Korean 
government
9. Eichengreen, 
Perkins, and Shin 
(2012)
• Learning and government policies for promoting economic 
growth 
• Adaptation to the global economic environment
• Rapid shift of export structure to focus on high-growth 
products 
• Export diversification 
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Korea’s Stabilization Policies in the 1980s (1980-1983)
A series of macroeconomic shocks from changes in the international economic 
environment had hit most developing countries for more than a decade since the 
mid-1970s. Those countries had to stabilize their disrupted economies. South Korea’s 
stabilization effort during these times has been heralded as a fairly successful one 
(Amsden, 1987; Collins and Park, 1988; Haggard and Moon, 1990; Taylor, 1988). 
Experts analyze substantive contents of the stabilization packages and identify logical 
models between the factors and their impacts on macro economy of South Korea.
As a knowledge-sharing effort, Cho and Kang (2013) recreated the Korean case as 
the KSP modularization case so that audience in any country of the world could access 
to the document online and learn some valuable lessons. This study intends to reorganize 
the case as an example from the perspective of knowledge sharing, evaluates its potential 
as a knowledge sharing repository, and find implications for improvements in developing 
case studies for knowledge sharing.
Crisis and its contexts
Readers of the case study as the knowledge seekers will be more likely to be 
inspired to learn from the case when they can identify similar development challenges in 
the case. The key challenge that the case study of Korea’s stabilization policies of the 
early 1980s (Cho and Kang, 2013) deals with is the balance-of-payments crisis in late 
1970s in Korea. Thus, policymakers in developing countries who face serious 
balance-of-payments crisis may become interested in this case study at first sight. 
For successful adaptation and internalization of the shared knowledge by the 
recipients, the contexts where crisis began and policymakers maneuvered to overcome the 
crisis should be provided in the case study. The chapter two of the case study (Cho and 
Kang, 2013) provides various contexts from global economic situations to political 
situations in Korea related to the serious balance-of-payments crisis in late 1970s in 
Korea and Korea’s stabilization policies.
However, the readers should be able to differentiate general (or similar contexts) that 
they can experience at any time of their reading and idiosyncratic contexts embedded in 
Korea at the time when the case happened.  In doing so, they can draw general insights 
from the case and adjust their strategies by taking into consideration of the different 
contexts between their own countries and Korea. 
After reviewing the case study, I reorganize contexts presented in the case study into 
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three categories: first, general contexts that any developing countries can experience 
regardless of time and location; second, general but time-specific contexts that many 
other developing countries might have shared during the time frame of the case, but not 
anymore now; third, idiosyncratic contexts where South Korea was embedded. 
First, although many different factors may cause balance-of-payments crisis in many 
different countries, chronic high inflation is regarded as a major culprit to lead to the 
edge of the balance-of-payments crisis. There is a typical pattern of a vicious cycle of 
inflation where inflation expectation and actual inflation reinforce each other in the cases 
of wage bargaining and financial contracts since economic actors tend to take for granted 
high level of inflation. Accordingly, wage inflation decreases export competitiveness by 
increasing production costs of the exporting industries and firms, which causes trade 
deficit. As a result, the government resorts to large amount of foreign loans to fill the 
deficit that leads to balance-of-payments crisis in the end. South Korea was not the 
exception during 1970s. Such a chain of actions can be triggered as long as there is 
chronic high inflation. Thus, the impending task for decision-makers who face such a 
vicious cycle in their country is to tackle chronic high inflation rates.
Second, the case study briefly explains the general but time-specific contexts that 
many developing countries in late 1970s and early 1980s experienced at the same time. 
The 1970s was a decade of global inflation since the abolition of the Bretton Woods 
system that had played a cornerstone of the international financial order for more than 
twenty years eroded the discipline of monetary policy in many countries and caused their 
monetary policy to be more likely to be accommodative, hence surged global inflation. 
Consequently, by the end of the 1970s, even the inflation rates of many advanced 
countries recorded double-digit figures for the first time in history (Cho and Kang, 
2013). Also, the first and second oil shocks in 1970s generated by Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)’s strong cartel inflicted critical blows on almost 
all resource-poor developing countries, including South Korea. 
Third, although the balance-of-payments crisis in South Korea in early 1980s was 
triggered by chronic high inflation and external shocks, the case study provided in detail 
the very idiosyncratic features of distortions and resource misallocations that are not 
typical of high inflation developing countries. Understanding these contexts allows readers 
to draw appropriate insights on why and how Korea’s stabilization policies were 
formulated and implemented. 
The most distinctive characteristics of economic policies in Korea in 1970s are 
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known as policy shift to promote heavy and chemical industries (HCI). Although the 
average annual growth rate recorded during the two decades of the 1960s and 1970s was 
almost ten percent, the very strategy of authoritarian military regime to selectively 
support HCI were all sources of distortions and resource misallocations. First, the 
financial market was a pipeline to convey the maximum amount of resources to strategic 
industries. Commercial banks provided a half of their deposits as policy loans with 
extremely low interests rates. Consequently, the Bank of Korea could not but bail out 
commercial bank that could not sustain their profits by lending their money to them. 
Second, the government provided various tax reductions and exemptions for exporters and 
strategic industries. Although the government managed to maintain a surplus in the 
general account by squeezing the budget for education, health and welfare, the 
consolidated budget including the special accounts for public projects recorded a deficit 
every year. The problem was that the government usually financed the budget deficit for 
special funds by borrowing from the Bank of Korea. Among many special funds, the 
Grain Management Fund2) was the largest fund that mostly relied upon the 
money-printing power of the Bank of Korea. Consequently, the money supply was 
rapidly increased with 30% growth rate per annum (Cho and Kang, 2013) during 1970s. 
The cheap credits to support HCI created perverse incentives for HCI industries to seek 
speculative profits by investing money borrowed with low interest rates from banks in 
real estate and expanding unproductive businesses. The demand for real estate by 
industries induced land price inflation that in turn, reduced export competitiveness of the 
industries. 
The reason why the government shifted its economic policy from labor-intensive light 
industries in the 1960s to HCI is controversial. But, Cho and Kang (2013) explained that 
the decision was political rather than economic. As the U.S. foreign policy3) shifted in a 
way to emphasize self-defense for Asian allies including South Korea and reduced its 
troops in South Korea, President Park, Jung-Hee felt the need to be more self-defensive 
through the development of HCI that could be a foundation for defense industries. 
2) To stabilize the farmer’s income, the government used the Grain Management Fund in purchasing rice and rye at 
higher levels than the market prices in the name of ‘dual prices policy’, which caused constant deficit in the fund.
3) President Nixon in 1969 declared the Guam Doctrine that urged Asian countries to rely more on themselves for 
their own security. 
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Korean solutions as explicit knowledge
The case study (Cho and Kang, 2013) explained the substantive policy measures in 
detail in the chapter 4 of the book. Those contents are explicit knowledge that can be 
delivered to the recipient as a useful reference for possible policy measures. However, as 
an international comparative study (Taylor, 1988) suggests, countries were adjusted in 
different ways with different packages, depending on their own local institutions, 
macroeconomic structure, and relationships among major political and social groups. Thus, 
as long as the case study provides enriched contexts that include general, specific, and 
idiosyncratic contexts around crisis and solutions, recipients of the explicit knowledge (the 
very contents of stabilization policy measures) may be more likely to understand better 
why certain policy measures were adopted over than others.
Usually, knowledge-sharing case studies often try to construct the logical linkage 
between successful outcomes and the contents of the policy measures that certain country 
took. When it comes to stabilization policies in Korea, the outcomes were amazing. The 
inflation rate in terms of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was stabilized from 28.7 
percent per annum in 1980 to 2.3 percent in 1984 (Cho and Kang, 2013). In case of the 
Producer Price Index (PPI), 39 percent in 1980 dropped into 0.2 % in 1983. Such 
lowered inflation rates were maintained during the 1982 and 1986 in Korea, which stood 
out compared to those of other developing and advanced countries. However, it is not 
always clear to connect between policy measures and apparent outcomes due to external 
intervention events during implementation. For example, the combination of dramatic fall 
of raw material prices, such as oil prices, and the degree of devaluation of Korean won 
contributed a lot to the drastic stabilization (Corbo and Nam, 1986).
The Korean packages with contextual knowledge may suggest to the readers, 
particularly who are considering unified or standardized policy package that were applied 
to many different contexts, that alternative or specific policy packages should be devised 
within their frameworks of their own specific economic and social characteristics. For 
example, African export farmers as habitual creditors of the crop marketing boards dislike 
inflation since it threatens the boards’ always precarious financial health. South Korean 
middle classes did not oppose inflation in the 1960s when they gained a lot from 
super-growth. Thus, what is perceived as a ‘moderate’ rate of price increase depends on 
the economy’s own history of inflation (Taylor, 1988).
The South Korean case as a ‘success’ one is scarcely historical paragon of liberal 
policy that argues production and efficiency rise when distortions are removed. Extreme 
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anti-distortionist regimes, such as Mexico suffered from macroeconomic disaster. Rather, 
Korean case shows its success with fairly heterodox packages combining price signals 
and directed state intervention, with getting prices right (removing distortions) playing a 
secondary role (Taylor, 1988).
Consequently, the implications of Korean policy measures as explicit knowledge for 
other developing countries situated in different contexts are limited. Some policy 
measures and techniques can be applied without any adjustment but others may not be 
useful. With such explicit knowledge shared, the audience just understand how its macro 
system works, the types of shocks it went through, the policy responses, and the 
resulting outcomes. Considering their own sectoral growth and price formation style 
requires unique problem-solving knowledge.
Tacit knowledge in the Korean case
If the audience or the recipients of the knowledge are policymakers or practitioners 
who should do something about stabilization rather than just analyze situations 
academically, they need totally different knowledge on ‘how-to.’ For example, ‘would-be’ 
reformers should be interested in how to formulate certain idea of policy measures, how 
to overcome potential oppositions from other rival agencies and private stakeholders 
driven by economic costs that stabilization packages incur, and how to persuade 
unwilling top decision-makers deeply drenched with conventional wisdom. 
Cho and Kang (2013) wonderfully explored to answer such questions in their case 
study with many anecdotal stories and interview transcripts with actual policymakers at 
that time of the case. This article reorganizes their description according to the 
framework of challenge and response since there were constant challenges a few 
reformers had faced before and even after the policy measures were designed and 
implemented. How they overcame such challenges could be distilled from Korean case. 
And that knowledge may have more implications that can be applied to more occasions 
in many parts of the world.
Where did the ideas come from? (How they did get that idea?) 
The idea of policy options to stabilize disrupted economies in developing countries 
was sought largely within the framework of orthodox macroeconomics, as reflected in the 
standard stabilization packages advocated by the International Monetary Fund for a large 
number of developing countries in the 1980s. In order to attain equilibrium within a 
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narrow monetary framework, the packages by and large involved a set of austerity 
measured sweetened with conditional balance of payments support under the auspices of 
the international financial institutions. However, the standard packages were imposed from 
outside to various developing countries without considering their own local contexts, such 
as local institutions, macroeconomic structure, and relationships among major political and 
social groups (Taylor, 1988).
In case of South Korea, the idea of policy options was not imposed from outside 
but from within. According to Cho and Kang (2013) and other scholars (Amsden, 1987) 
who studied the Korean case, a few elite government officials and American-trained 
technocrats were the key agents of change. How they got to hold the belief that there 
should be a major reform and formulate the very idea of policy options could not be 
explicitly articulated without hearing from themselves about their belief and perception of 
the situation at that time. 
Such a tacit knowledge embedded in people and their value system can be identified 
in their own remarks, often explored in their personal memoirs or through face-to-face 
interviews. The case study by Cho and Kang (2013) used a quotation in the book by 
Mr. Kang, Kyung-Sik, who was appointed as the Assistant Secretary of the Economic 
Planning Board (EPB) in 1977, to deliver the tacit knowledge.
“…Right after I was appointed to that position in 1977, I had to present 
to President Park the contents of the report, ‘Long-term (15 years) 
Economic and Social Development Plan’ that had been produced by the 
Korea Development Institute (KDI)…All the contents were full of rosy 
outlooks, predicting ten percent annual growth and a current account 
surplus from 1981. Something was wrong in that the forecast was made 
with an assumption of a high inflation rate (8.4 percent annually) for the 
next fifteen years. It seemed to me that the high inflation rate was taken 
for granted by almost all of the policymakers as unavoidable necessary 
evil rather than a malaise that should be cured. There was unquestioned 
faith toward the current economic growth strategies…I came to have a 
strong conviction that we needed to revamp current growth strategies that 
focus on HCI with fundamentally different angle…”
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How can a few with a new idea break dominant and conventional wisdom and 
make a paradigm shift (from the government-led economic development paradigm to 
more market-oriented system)?
Although a few elite officials came up with new but orthodox ideas to address the 
root-causes of chronic high inflation, those ideas were against the dominant paradigm of 
the government-led development strategy, the backbone of the ‘Korean Miracle’ for 
almost two decades. Under the very hierarchical and authoritarian regime, it was very 
difficult to challenge and persuade top policy-makers, particularly, President Park who 
was convinced that his decision of the government-led development strategy had been 
very successful so far. 
At the same time, those ideas themselves were not easy to operationalize practically. 
The only way to control the money supply was to reduce the burden of the Bank of 
Korea in supporting HCIs by retrenching other fiscal spending, such as national defense 
and agricultural subsidies, which was almost impossible to do, considering their political 
consequences. Opening the economy for free trade in order to enhance competition in the 
country meant no more protection for domestic industries. 
  1) Strengthen the idea and argument with best available human resources 
As the assistant Secretary of the EPB, Mr. Kang needed allies who supported his 
aspirational mandate to change the paradigm by formulating major policy strategies 
and persuading key top policymakers within the government. What he did as the first 
step was to form a special task force team that involved brilliant junior staff members 
in the EPB and a few selected economists from Korea Development Institute (KDI), a 
government think tank. They were ordered to conduct a secret mission to review the 
status of the Korean economy comprehensively. Such a daunting task even bound 
team members in the guesthouse of the Korea Institute of Science and Technology as 
a base camp for many sleepless nights. Over two months, they analyzed all the 
structural aspects of high inflation and formulated a policy package, so-called, 
‘Comprehensive Stabilization Plan’ (CSP) to address the problems. 
One of the answers to explain the Korean formulation of distinct policy packages 
for stabilization without any intervention from the international financial organizations 
at that time is that South Korea had been building capacity to analyze and formulate 
economic policy by establishing the KDI, a prestigious government think tank since 
1971 where a few elite American-trained economists were scouted to work. 
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  2) Bootstrapping advocacy coalition building within the government
Mr, Kang approached to Mr. Nam, Duk-Woo, the head of the EPB who was also 
the Vice Prime Minister at that time and presented the main arguments from the final 
report from the special task force to persuade him into his coalition. Although he 
agreed to the all the conclusion of the report, Mr. Nam just sat on the report and did 
not get to President Park. Mr. Nam might have calculated groundbreaking 
consequences of implementing the proposed policy package, particularly on the general 
election ahead in 1978. Also, another effort to persuade President Park via a top 
policy-maker, such as the Minister of Finance, Mr. Kim, Young-Hwan was in vain 
although Mr. Kim also supported the stabilization policy (Kang, 1987).
However, Mr. Kang’s initial effort to build consensus within the EPB and with 
other Ministries was not fruitless at all. All of the few junior government officials 
who participated in the task force team including Mr. Kim, Jae-Ik, Mr. Park, 
Yu-Kwang, Mr. Moon, Hee-Gap, and Mr. Lee, Hyung-Ku were promoted later to 
important positions where they got the power to push the stabilization policies in 
early 1980s. Also, Mr. Kang utilized all the venues available to persuade top 
decision-makers into agreeing to comprehensive change. For example, when he 
happened to attend the World Health Organization (WHO) conference in Soviet Union 
as an official business trip for two weeks with the Minister of Public Health and 
Society, Mr. Shin, Hyun-Hwak, Mr. Kang argued to Mr. Shin that Korean economy 
was exhibiting similar negative symptoms as those of the planned economy in Soviet 
Union (Kang, 1987). The Minister who realized the importance of the market-based 
economic institutions and was very favorable of the stabilization policy was appointed 
to the new head of the EPB soon in December 1989. With the new leadership of Mr. 
Shin, the stabilization policy could regain active momentum within the EPB. 
Mr. Shin as the new head of the EPB in late 1978 once again ordered to make 
more effective presentation materials with strong and sound arguments for the 
stabilization policies and finally presented them to President Park at the 
beginning-of-the-year EPB briefing in January 1979. However, the initial reaction of 
President Park was not promising. His disapproval of the stabilization policies became 
apparent in a number of his remarks on other occasions. For example, he commented 
at the briefing session with the Ministry of Foreign Relations, “Recently, some crazy 
nuts in the government says we should decrease support for the export industry.” In 
another briefing session with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that proposed 
the plan, ‘Fostering ten strategic HCIs,’ President Park praised their plan, saying 
“Today I heard the most promising and ambitious plan that hits the nail right on the 
head.”  
Negative comments of President Park against the EPB proposal of stabilization 
triggered all the oppositions from all the Ministries in the government that had stakes 
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in and committed to the current government-led growth strategies. For example, the 
Economic Cooperation Bureau disagreed with the EPB. The Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry whose mission was to protect domestic industries was against the idea of 
liberalizing the imports and reducing the amount of export financing. The Ministry of 
Finance was fiercely critical of the idea of financial deregulation on the ground that 
the idea was too premature. The Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery also opposed the 
abolishment of the dual pricing system of rice and fertilizers in order to protect the 
farmers. 
When the proposal was leaked outside the government, all the stake-holding entities 
whose interests would be affected negatively by the stabilization policies tried very 
hard to lobby against them. Those included all of the business entities that opposed 
raised loan interest rates, export industries that opposed the abolishment of the export 
finance and subsidies, HCI industries that were against restructuring investments and 
subsidies, and farmers that did not welcome the idea of importing agricultural goods.
The situation of the EPB at that time was well described by Mr. Kang’s 
recollection (Kang, 1988). 
“It was as if the EPB was alone, surrounded by enemies and there was 
no way out. And it became so evident that we needed a series of 
consensus building strategies…since without the other Ministries with 
implementing powers the ideas could not be realized…Thus, we held 
numerous conferences on the stabilization policy and was successful in 
gaining the support of the academics and the media…”
3) Muddling through with a piecemeal approach vs. Comprehensive approach
When the efforts to drive comprehensive change toward the new paradigm were 
stuck at the last stage, the government could not but resort to rather piecemeal 
approaches in order to stabilize shocked Korean economy. For example, they 
established the Countermeasure Committee for Liberalization of Imports in February 
1978 to increase the rate of import liberalization. Also, many policy measures were 
announced to control the rapidly increasing apartment prices in the same year. Some 
policy measures produced tangible outcomes. However, as a whole, those piecemeal 
approaches were not effective and produced limited outcomes since all of these 
policies to control the rising inflation rates in 1978 were focused on the symptoms 
rather than the root-cause of expanding money supply in order to maintain fast 
growth.
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4) Crisis (危機) represents Danger (危) and Opportunity(機).
The Chinese word for “crisis” is made up of two characters; one represents 
‘danger,’ and the other ‘opportunity.’ Crisis often provides strong rationale for change. 
Thus, for reformers, crisis can be utilized as a tool with which they can persuade 
decision-makers and other stakeholders. 
Not until President Park perceived the problem situations of the current paradigm 
for himself did his position start to change. In February 1979, President Park visited 
Changwon Industrial Park, the center of HCI and just witnessed the huge capacity of 
the HCI was idle due to extensively duplicative investments. The EPB used this 
opportunity to advance their arguments against the second wave of additional 
investments in HCIs.
President Park needed to confirm the validity of the proposal from the EPB by 
commissioning policy analysis activities on the current economic situations from many 
different sources, such as the Bank of Korea, Korea Development Institute, and the 
Economic-Science Council. All of these reports presented similar findings and 
validated the conclusions of the EPB report. Finally, President Park approved to 
consolidate all of the reports into a single policy package and implement it. On April 
17, 1979, the Comprehensive Economic Stabilization Policy (CESP) was announced 
publicly. 
The hierarchical structure of the government in turn made it easy for the EPB to 
neutralize the opposition from various Ministries since President Park’s approval of the 
EPB proposal ended the power game among the Ministries. However, almost all of 
the business sectors kept complaining about the difficulty of securing financial 
resources. It would take several years the EPB to implement the CESP and produce 
tangible outcomes. Thus, another challenge for the EPB was to make Korea endure 
economic hardships patiently for such a long time.
5) Crisis in Crisis 
External contexts surrounding policy-making and implementation often change 
dynamically. The case of the Korean stabilization policy shows dramatic change of 
surrounding contexts during policy implementation and how the agents of change 
responded effectively to address the change.
When the CESP was finally announced and ready to be implanted in 1979, the 
second Oil Shock hit the country unfortunately. At the same time, rising demand for 
more democratic society from the public resulted in civil riots in some parts of the 
country. Under such turmoil, the government should implement the CESP 
incrementally.
The most breaking change was ahe political power due to the assassination of 
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President Park on October 26, 1976. Instead of chaos, the top government officials 
stood together under the leadership of Vice Prime Minister Shin to send the signal of 
constant economic policy to the public in no time. During the following three months 
after the assassination, all of the ministers related to the CESP got together to build 
consensus to promote national interests rather than their individual ones. 
Despite public’s aspiration for democracy after the assassination of the authoritative 
leader, another military coup led by General Chun, Doo-Hwan occurred in December 
1979. Nobody could figure out the fate of the CESP under the turbulent political 
currents since it was so uncertain who would seize political power in the end. At this 
point, the EPB quickly turned their attention to the general public and other political 
leaders who had been ignored so far in policy-making processes. In early 1980, the 
EPB prepared a presentation slides, titled, ‘National Economy We Should Think 
Together’ that explained frankly the structural problems of the Korean economy at 
that time using plain terms rather than technical jargons so that general public could 
understand the contents easily. 
Right after General Chun’s military coup, the National Security Council (NSC) 
became the only decision-making apparatus and General Chun, the Chair of the NSC, 
assumed the presidency through an indirect election. However, in the same year, 
Korean economy recorded a negative 6.2 percent GNP growth rate. Thus, overcoming 
economic crisis became the main agenda for the new political leaders, mostly young 
military officers, to earn legitimacy of the military coup. The NSC hurried to make 
necessary reforms with such a basic attitude as “You policy specialists (or technocrats) 
make the optimal (economic) decisions and we will push them through the political 
opposition.”
Some decisions were quickly implemented through strong-arms tactics of the NSC’s 
despite fierce resistance of stake-holding groups. For example, the Fair Transaction 
System Law that could not have been enacted due to serious opposition from large 
conglomerates, chaebols, was approved by the NSC in December 1980. As a result, 
the Fair Transaction Department was established in the EPB. However, other hasty 
decisions made by the NSC rather distorted the principles of the CESP and the EPB 
had to be against the NSC’s decision. For example, the NSC attempted to consolidate 
companies within the same industry sectors without due process or appropriate 
analysis. That decision would weaken market institutions and create monopolistic 
power over each industry sector, such as automobile industry and electricity-generating 
equipment industry. 
6) It is people not the policies who make a reform happen in the end.  
Mr. Kim, Jae-Ik who was selected by Mr. Kang as a government official member 
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of the special task force team to build a foundation for the stabilization policies 
remained as an important member of the NSC. Later, Mr. Kim was promoted to the 
powerful top decision-maker in economic policy in Korea. 
Feeling the need to recuperate economic situation as a way to gain political 
legitimacy on the military regime, President Chun was eager to learn economic 
policies during his term as the Chair of the NSC. Then, Mr. Kim was found as a 
private tutor for President Chun and spent at least two hours almost every day in 
educating President Chun. According to Lee (2008), President Chun seemed to be 
impressed with Kim’s sound logic and capacity to simplify complex economic issues 
with plain language. Mr. Kim’s major points for President Chun were the principles 
of the CESP. 
Finally, when President Chun asked Mr. Kim to be his Senior Secretary at the 
Blue House, Mr. Kim answered that he would serve under one condition, saying,
“if you are to implement economic policies as I advise you, you will 
have to face grave oppositions from almost everyone out there. Would 
you willing to accept and implement my words against all others?”
President Chun replied, 
“No need to say anything else. You are the President when it comes to 
economic policies.” 
This anecdotal story suggests the amount of power that Mr. Kim was bestowed by 
President Chun in formulating and implementing stabilization policies in his political 
term. 
7) Takeover the rival agency by seeding our men!
Although the ministers of various agencies seemed to stand together regarding 
progressive stabilization policies in the wake of assassination of President Park and 
new military coup by General Chun, tensions among them reappeared and be 
intensified when those policies were on the table to be implemented. Conflict lingered 
between the EPB and the Ministry of Finance and between the EPB and the Ministry 
of the Trade and Commerce.
The EPB was not always successful in winning over the Ministry of Finance. 
There were constant debates between Mr. Kim, Jae-Ik, as the Senior Economic 
Advisor to President Chun, and Mr. Lee, Seung-Yoon, the Minister of the Finance 
regarding the independency of the Bank of Korea. President Chun initially supported 
Mr. Kim’s position to protect the Bank of Korea from political interference but 
changed his mind by the arguments of the Ministry of Finance that such a drastic 
reform might affect negatively the performance of the whole national economy.
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However, Mr. Kim’s move as a close advisor to President Chun totally changed 
the power dynamics between the two agencies. What he suggested to President Chun 
was to reshuffle cabinet members in order to reduce conflicts, but in a way to give 
more power to the EPB. For examples, reformists in the EPB were promoted to the 
higher positions in the Ministry of Finance while officials in the Ministry of Finance 
were demoted to the EPB positions. Consequently, Mr. Kang was promoted to the 
Minister of the Finance, which completed the takeover of the Ministry of Finance by 
the reformists from the EPB. Afterwards, the EPB could pursue more stringent policy 
measures toward stabilization without opposition from the Ministry of Finance.  
8) Gain legitimacy on political regime with unpopular policies
Most of the stabilization policies to check chronic high inflation were inherently 
unpopular since they were supposed to generate burdens and pains for whole society. 
Thus, new regime created by military coup was in dilemma to earn political 
legitimacy with unpopular policy measures. 
Mr.Kang’s remarks in his interview suggest why the government tried so hard to 
outreach the general public in the area of economic policymaking. 
“There was simply too much opposition to the CESP since it created 
more visible losers (such as large conglomerates, and labor unions) 
than unorganized and invisible winners (the general public in the long 
time). Balancing of the political power was necessary, and it seemed 
that the only viable approach at that time was to create favorable 
public opinions to put political pressures on actors.” (Cho and Kang, 
2013)
Mr. Kang asked the KDI to develop public relations program with a media 
aimed at generating public support for the CESP. The message of the education 
program for the public was simple. Implementing such policies would be painful in 
the short term but beneficial in the long run. Using the media as the tool for public 
outreach program was possible since the Chun’s regime actively controlled the media 
at that time. Also, the government established the Economic Policy Public Relations 
Planning Group in November 1981 that became the Department of Economic 
Education Planning in the EPB later. 
Mr. Kim, Jae-Ik, as the Chief Economic Advisor to President Chun, pushed hard 
for economic education. The target audience included not only the government 
officials, but also college professors, elementary school teachers, and even soldiers in 
military service. 
It is difficult to assess, however, how effective such massive public outreach 
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campaign was in generating public support for tough policy measures since the 
military regime of President Chun was also suppressive to opposition and no one 
freely could voice their opinions at that time. 
Conclusion
KSP modularization projects as case studies on Korean development experience 
have lots of potential as a knowledge-sharing tool for international audience who 
wonder how Korea achieved so much so far. Unlike academic analysis focusing on 
causality between policy measures and impacts, case studies set up specific audience, 
that is, actual policymakers and practitioners, who should adjust, internalize, and 
implement shared knowledge. 
When knowledge of development is constructed in the form of case study as in 
Korean modularization project, audiences are not specified but global. It is impossible 
for knowledge producers to understand every different context and situation of 
potential recipient countries. Thus, knowledge producers should explicitly explain their 
own contexts, capacities, and challenges that they faced in their development so that 
audiences could identify similarities with and difference from theirs.
A success story can be regarded basically as a story where actors face daunting 
challenges and overcame them. Thus, all the case studies can be sorted out according 
to the typologies of challenge that the actors face in development. The challenges 
may be distinct under specific contexts, but some are very general. We can distill 
some general sets of challenges from the Korean case of stabilization policies of 
early 1980s. For example, one general challenge is to persuade decision-makers who 
hold belief that their conventional wisdom will be successful forever although 
successful policies in the past often create unexpected negative consequences. Or, a 
challenge for reformists is always to build consensus among opponents and many 
other stakeholders who will be negatively affected by reform packages. This article 
tries to argue there are more important knowledge base of tacit knowledge of 
‘how-to” apart from the substantive policy measures as explicit knowledge. One way 
to draw tacit knowledge is to generalize challenges and crisis at most abstract level 
so that all the producers and audiences can share its implications. 
Cho and Kang (2013) elaborated wonderfully how a few Korean reformers 
responded to constantly rising challenges. Such knowledge on how they did it cannot 
be articulated clearly only with explicit knowledge of policy measures and their 
impact since such tacit knowledge is embedded in peoples’ perception, value, their 
tasks, routines, and capacity.
If all the case studies in KSP modularization projects can be utilized in a way to 
deliver tacit knowledge of ‘how-to’ overcome challenges effectively, then knowledge 
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producers may identify hidden capacity of Korean people with which they were 
successful in facing challenges and crisis and finally overcoming them. Such 
capacities should be shared and built through knowledge sharing activities between 
Korea and other partner countries. Finally, the KSP modularization case studies can 
be reconfigured for story-telling and discussion in group settings so that they could 
adapt tacit knowledge under their different contexts from those in the past in Korea. 
In doing so, more audiences in recipient countries will be attracted to such a case 
study and internalize that case if they can not only identify similar general challenges 
in that case that are constantly rising in their development path and but also 
differentiate distinct challenges from their own. 
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